California’s New Ethics Standards: A Hot Bed of Controversy
and Conflicting Decisions
1.

Introduction

As a general rule, the arbitrator appointed to hear a given matter is required to disclose
conflicts of interest to ensure the fairness and integrity of the process by rendering an objective
and impartial decision. Heretofore, a “rule of reasonableness” governed conflicts of interest
disclosure, meaning that the arbitrator had a duty to use reasonable efforts to conduct a
reasonable inquiry regarding conflicts of interest and to make disclosures to the parties regarding
same.1 This was a relatively subjective standard that most certainly varied on a case-by-case /
arbitrator-by-arbitrator basis, and is no longer the rule in California.
Until recently, private arbitration2 primarily involved repeat players who were familiar
with the arbitration process, the provider organizations and sometimes the arbitrators
themselves.3 As such, there were few cases concerning inappropriate arbitrator behavior4
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Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution which is often used in lieu of traditional litigation. It has
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because the “players” in that system were familiar with and in many respects self-regulated the
process and its participants.
In September 2001, the California Legislature enacted SB 475 to address, among other
things, disclosure of arbitrator conflicts of interest by imposing new regulations upon the private
arbitration process and its neutrals.5 The new law significantly revised the disclosure
requirements and procedures for disqualifying arbitrators in private arbitration matters, and went
far beyond anything theretofore on the books regulating the private arbitration process. The new
law was believed to be necessary due to what the California Legislature perceived to be a lack of
public confidence in private arbitration, which perception was at odds with the general purpose
of arbitration law which is to “advance arbitration as an alternative to litigation.”6 That concern
was prompted by the increased use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in various types of
consumer and employment contracts, where the arbitration clauses are embedded in form
contracts offered on a “take it or leave it basis,”7 thus making the selection of arbitration for
dispute resolution an involuntary choice by the consumer party. In consumer advocate circles,
the concern was that the party requiring the pre-dispute arbitration clause as a condition to
entering into a contractual relationship with another party had too much power because that party
5

The new disclosure requirements set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.9 and Standard
7(d) of Division VI of the California Rules of Court are referred to in this paper as the “New Ethics Rules.”
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(1988) (“Carbonneau Article”).

2

could chose and impose the arbitration process, define the rules and even select the arbitral
forum leading to the potential for unfair advantage over the other party.8 In short, the California
Legislature thought that its intervention was necessary to even the playing field for consumers.9
Even though the impetus for the new standards was concern for unsophisticated or
inexperienced consumers forced into arbitration with companies that were intimately familiar
with the private arbitration process, the provider organizations and the arbitrators, the new
disclosure rules apply to all private arbitrations conducted in California, not just consumer
arbitrations, excepting only those arbitrations conducted pursuant to the terms of a public or
private sector collective bargaining agreement.10
SB 475 has been the subject of controversy and debate since it was enacted and the
Judicial Council was mandated to adopt disclosure and disqualification requirements that would
apply to all neutral arbitrators.11 Controversy and criticism began on the “Blue Ribbon Panel of
Experts on Arbitration Ethics” which the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court
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appointed to assist the Judicial Council in its task,12 and started with the abbreviated time frame
in which the new ethics standards were adopted which did not allow time for meaningful
comment before the rules became effective.13 Importantly, although much of the criticism
leading to the enactment of SB 475 was directed at the perceived conflicts of interest created by
arbitration provider organizations and their repeat customers, the regulation of private
organizations is not within the general authority of the Judicial Council,14 and so SB 475 focused
on standards for arbitrators, generally, and not on the specific acts provider organizations could
or could not do.15 Clearly, however, the regulation of private arbitrators has had an impact on
the provider organizations with whom the arbitrators are associated.
It is not surprising to find that the controversy and debate concerning the standards for
arbitration disclosures and disqualification has continued since the new ethics standards became
effective on July 1, 2002. Much of that debate has occurred in civil litigation cases filed in the
state and federal courts of California. This paper will survey some of the more significant
decisions, examine their holdings, and discuss the uncertainty and other problems attendant to
conducting a private arbitration in California.
2.

California’s New Ethics Rules

In 1961, California adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act16 which provided for vacatur of
a neutral arbitrator’s award based upon bias.17 However, as originally enacted, there were no
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specific disclosure requirements imposed upon neutral arbitrators.18 In 1994, California enacted
Section 1281.9 of the California Code of Civil Procedure to require specific arbitrator
disclosures.19 As originally enacted, the disclosure requirements under Section 1281.9 were
relatively narrow, requiring only disclosure of information concerning arbitrations that involved
the same parties or lawyers in the current arbitration where the arbitrator served or was currently
serving as a neutral or party arbitrator.20 In 1997, Section 1281.9 was amended to expand those
disclosure requirements to include any attorney-client relationship the arbitrator has or had with
any party or lawyer and any professional or significant personal relationship the arbitrator, his or
her spouse, or minor child living in the household has or had with any party or lawyer.21 In
2001, SB 475 amended Section 1281.9 to further expand arbitrator disclosure requirements to
include any ground specified for disqualification of judges under Section 170.1 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure and any matters required to be disclosed by the ethics standards for
neutral arbitrators adopted by the Judicial Council.22
The “judicial” disclosure requirements contained in Section 170.1 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure describe six specific disclosure obligations and one catchall disclosure
obligation. Standard 7(d) of the New Ethics Rules details thirteen specific disclosure obligations
17

An arbitrator’s failure to disclose information indicative of bias constitutes grounds to vacate an award under
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2(a)(1) (“award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
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a neutral arbitrator must disclose “dealings that might create an impression of possible bias,” and that the failure to
do so constitutes misconduct and creates a ground to set aside the award. Commonwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co.
(1968) 393 U.S. 145, 149, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301; Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hospital Ass’n
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and one catchall disclosure obligation. The seven disclosure obligations found in Section 170.1
and the other disclosure requirements contained in Section 1281.9 are, for the most part,
mirrored in Standard 7(d).23 Standard 7(d) then expands upon the “judicial” disclosure
requirements to require disclosure of any “professional relationship” the arbitrator or a member
of the arbitrator’s immediate family has had with a party or lawyer to the proceeding,24 of any
“interest” that the arbitrator or a member of the arbitrator’s immediate family has that “could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the arbitration,”25 and of membership in any
organization that practices discrimination of any kind.26
Through SB 475 the disqualification procedures theretofore contained in Section 1281.9
were moved to a new code section – Section 1281.91. That section retained the provision for
any party to disqualify a neutral arbitrator if he or she fails to make the disclosures required by
Section 1281.9(a).27 It also retained the provision for any party to disqualify a neutral arbitrator
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disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. Standard 7(d)(7) and Section 170.1(a)(2) require disclosure if
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proceeding or a party to the proceeding. Standard 7(d)(1) and Section 170.1(a)(4) require disclosure if the judge /
arbitrator (or a member of his / her extended family) is a party to the proceeding or an officer, director or trustee of a
party. Standard 7(d)(2) and Section 170.1(a)(5) require disclosure if the judge / arbitrator (or a member of his / her
extended family) is the spouse, former spouse, child, sibling or parent of a lawyer or spouse of a lawyer in the
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Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.91(a). Like its predecessor (Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.9(b)), Section 1281.91(a) entitles
any party to serve a notice of disqualification within 15 days after the proposed nominee or appointee fails to
comply.
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on the basis of the disclosures made.28 It likewise retained the provision for waiver of a party’s
right to disqualify if the if timely notice of disqualification is not made.29
The significant change to the disqualification procedures is found in subsection (d) of
Section 1281.91, which added a requirement that a neutral arbitrator must disqualify himself or
herself upon demand of any party based upon disclosures made under Section 170.1 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure.30 That new section works hand-in-hand with the vacatur
provisions found in Section 1286.2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. As amended in
1993, Section 1286.2 allowed vacatur of an arbitration award if the arbitrator making the award
was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 1281.9 but failed upon receipt
of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required.31 As amended in 2001 by SB 475,
the vacatur provisions were expanded to allow vacatur of an arbitration award if the arbitrator
making the award failed to make timely disclosures.32 In adding this additional ground for
vacatur, the California Legislature stated that the addition of this new subparagraph was intended
to be “declarative of existing case law which provides that an arbitration award may be vacated
when a neutral arbitrator fails to disclose a matter that might cause a reasonable person to
question the ability of the arbitrator to conduct the arbitration proceeding impartially.”33
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Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.91(b)(1). Like its predecessor (Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.9(c)(1)), Section
1281.91(b)(1) entitles any party to serve a notice of disqualification within 15 days after receipt of the disclosures.
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Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.91(c). Like its predecessor (Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1281.9(d)), Section 1281.91(c)
provides that the right of a party to disqualify a proposed neutral arbitrator shall be waived if the party fails to timely
serve the notice required by this section.
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31
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SB 475 also added Section 1281.85 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which
delegated authority to the Judicial Council to adopt mandatory ethical standards for all
individuals serving as neutral arbitrators in contractual arbitrations held in California and
instructed that the Judicial Council do so by July 1, 2002.34 Pursuant to this mandate, in April
2002 the Judicial Council adopted the “Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual
Arbitration”.35 Along with the statutory amendments created by SB 475, the new arbitrator
ethics rules became effective on July 1, 2002 and apply to any person “serving as a neutral
arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration agreement.”36
The authority to disqualify an arbitrator based upon his or her failure to make conflict
disclosures or the disclosures themselves has been vested with the parties since Section 1281.9
was first enacted in 1994.37 Those disqualification procedures and rights are now codified at
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.91(a) and (b)(1). Section 1281.91, enacted
pursuant to SB 475, goes further and now imposes an affirmative duty on the part of the neutral
arbitrator to disqualify himself or herself if any disclosures are made under the “judicial”
disclosure requirements which are now applicable to neutral arbitrators under Section
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Cal.Rptr.2d 685; Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 215; Neaman v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospital (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1170, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 879; Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 345,
133 Cal.Rptr. 775.
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1281.9(a)(1),38 thereby elevating arbitrator ethics to the level of judicial ethics with the stroke of
the pen.
3.

New Ethics Rules Cases

Since the effective date of the New Ethics Rules in July 2002, there has been a steady
stream of cases – some reported and some not – involving the enforceability and application of
the new legislation. While California is no stranger to controversy in the arbitration arena,39 the
litigation fanfare which has accompanied the New Ethics Rules legislation is unprecedented. As
discussed below, the cases fall into four general categories and demonstrate through their
conflicting holdings the clouds of controversy and uncertainty that presently hang over private
arbitration in California. The four categories are: preemption challenges under federal securities
law; preemption challenges under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”); contract defense
challenges under California law; and cases applying the New Ethics Rules by seeking vacatur for
failure to comply with the disclosure and disqualification requirements.
A.

Federal Securities Law Preemption Challenges
(1)

Backdrop

The SEC encourages the use of arbitration in resolving disputes arising out of the
securities industry.40 In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
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In 1984, the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine whether franchisees’ agreement to arbitrate all
disputes with the franchisor was enforceable in the face of the California Franchise Investment Law which provided
that franchise disputes were excepted from coverage under the California Arbitration Act and could not be forced to
arbitration over the franchisee’s objection. Southland v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 1, 104 S.Ct. 852.
The Supreme Court invalidated the California Franchise Investment Law provision in question (§ 1512) because it
selected out arbitration agreements for invalidation on grounds not related to the enforceability of contracts in
general.
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Jamie Kent, The Debate in California Over and Implications of New Ethical Standards for Arbitrator
Disclosure: Are the Changes Valid or Appropriate?, 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 903, 906 (Summer 2004) (the “Kent
Article”), citing, Michael A. Pierno, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator
Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities Arbitrations (Nov. 4, 2002).
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McMahon,41 that “claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 … could be
submitted to arbitration.”42 Pursuant to this support, self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”)
regulated by the SEC43 have integrated arbitration into their operations.
Almost immediately after the New Ethics Rules became effective in July 2002, litigation
was filed challenging the enforceability of the new disclosure and vacatur requirements as
applied to arbitrations conducted by the NYSE, the second oldest national securities exchange in
the United States,44 and the NASD. As SROs, the NYSE and NASD are part of the
comprehensive system of federal regulation of the securities industry. While SROs are subject to
oversight by the SEC,45 they are nevertheless private organizations. Under the Supremacy
Clause, federal law preempts conflicting state law.46 Federal regulations issued by an agency
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority are included among the “Laws of the
United States” which can preempt state law.47 The unique circumstance presented by the cases
discussed below is that the arbitration rules at issue were adopted by the SROs – which are
private entities – as distinguished from the SEC or some other federal agency.

41

(1987) 482 U.S. 220, 96 L.Ed.2d 185, 107 S.Ct. 2332
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Kent Article, supra, citing, Carbonneau Article, supra, 40 Me. L. Rev. at 268.
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The National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”) are
SROs registered with the SEC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (the “Exchange Act”). The NASD is registered
under 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. The NYSE is registered under 15 U.S.C. § 78f.

44

15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, et seq.; see Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1101.

45

15 U.S.C. § 78s; Austin Mun. Securities, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc. (5th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d
676, 680.
46

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.

47

City of New York v. FCC (1988) 486 U.S. 57, 63-64, 100 L.Ed.2d 48, 108 S.Ct. 1637.
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Prior to the adoption of the New Ethics Rules, the NYSE and NASD lobbied the
California Legislature and Judicial Council for an exemption from the New Ethics Rules.48
Those lobbying efforts failed. In response, the NYSE and NASD ceased appointing arbitrators
to arbitrations in California as of the July 1, 2002 effective date of the New Ethics Rules because
they believed those rules were inconsistent with their respective arbitrator disclosure rules and in
conflict with the SRO arbitration programs which are part of a federal regulatory system
overseen on a uniform, national basis by the SEC.49 Both organizations likewise adopted interim
rules, approved by the SEC, which gave customers and associated persons the option to waive
application of the New Ethics Rules and proceed with arbitrator appointment under the NASD or
NYSE rules or to proceed with arbitration out-of-state.50
(2)

NASD Case

In addition to the above-described actions, the NASD and NYSE also filed a declaratory
relief action in July 2002 seeking a judicial determination that the New Ethics Rules were
inapplicable to SRO arbitrations.51 The NASD case was dismissed on November 12, 2002
without reaching the merits based on the court’s conclusion that the Judicial Council and its
individual members (sued in their official capacities) were immune from suit in federal court

48

Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1102.

49

NASD “Notice to Parties in California Arbitration Matters”; NYSE “Notice to California Investors in Arbitration
under NYSE Rules.” Professor Menkel-Meadow has written that “perhaps the most important source of ‘law’ in
ethics and standards in the conduct of arbitration is the contract or agreement that establishes the arbitration in the
first place.” Menkel-Meadow Article, supra, 56 U. Miami L. Rev. at 972. This is because contracts containing predispute arbitration clauses frequently specify which SROs or provider organizations may conduct the arbitration and
provides that the proceeding will be governed by the standards of the presiding organization. See, Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co. (1974) 417 U.S. 506, 519, 41 L.Ed.2d 270, 94 S.Ct. 2449 (“An agreement to arbitrate before a specified
tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits … the procedure to be used in the
dispute.”
50

NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10100(f); NYSE Arbitration Rules, Rule 600(g).

51

NASD Dispute Resolution v. Judicial Council of CA (N.D.Cal. 2002) 232 F.Supp.2d 1055.

11

under the Eleventh Amendment.52 That determination thus left the issue to private-party
litigation, of which there has been plenty.
(3)

Mayo Case

In April 2003, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
decided Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,53 which addressed the issue of whether the New
Ethics Rules apply to SRO arbitrators in California. In Mayo, an account holder filed a state
court action in March 2001 against an investment company alleging that company’s failure to
reimburse him for unauthorized ATM withdrawals in violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act and state law. The investment company removed the action to federal court and filed a
motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act,54 which was granted. In
February 2002, the account holder commenced arbitration proceedings before the NYSE55 by
filing a statement of claim and executing a Uniform Submission Agreement.56 The arbitration
was never convened because, in July 2002, the NYSE informed the plaintiff that it would not
appoint an arbitrator in his case because it was temporarily suspending the assignment of all
arbitrators in California in response to the New Ethics Rules. Plaintiff then filed a motion
seeking to be relieved entirely from his obligation to arbitrate the dispute, which the court
construed as a motion for reconsideration on the basis of an intervening change in

52

Id. at 1063-1066.

53

(N.D.Cal. 2003) 258 F.Supp.2d 1097.

54

9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (the “FAA”).

55

The Client Account Agreement signed by the plaintiff provided for arbitration “only before the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc.; the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; or the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
as [plaintiff] may elect.” Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1099.

56

The Uniform Submission Agreement provides that the arbitration “will be conducted in accordance with the
Constitution, By-Laws, Rules, Regulations and/or Code of Arbitration Procedure of the sponsoring organization.”
Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1100.
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circumstance:57 namely, did the NYSE’s refusal to appoint an arbitration panel that was
compliant with the New Ethics Rules constitute a change in circumstances warranting the
requested relief?58
The court in Mayo found that the Exchange Act and its subsequent amendments created
“’a detailed, comprehensive system of federal regulation of the securities industry,’” in which
SROs played an important and necessary role.59 The court noted that while the SRO arbitration
rules and California standards shared “similar goals with respect to disclosure and
disqualification,”60 the fact of common end did not mean that their means were not conflicting.61
The court found that the means were conflicting in several regards: that the New Ethics Rules
would require arbitrators to disclose information that need not be disclosed under the NYSE or
NASD rules;62 that application of the New Ethics Rules would require disqualification of
arbitrators and vacatur of awards in circumstances where the SRO rules do not;63 and that under
the New Ethics Rules, the role of the Director of Arbitration for the NASD and NYSE would be
greatly reduced if not totally eliminated.64 The court concluded that the “disclosure and
disqualification requirements of the SRO arbitration rules are tailored specifically to the

57

Mayo, 258 F.Supp.2d at 1104.

58

Id.

59

258 F.Supp.2d at 1108, citing Swirsky v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers (1st Cir. 1997), 124 F.3d 59, 61.

60

258 F.Supp.2d at 1109.

61

Id., citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council (2000) 530 U.S. 363, 380, 147 L.Ed.2d 352, 120 S.Ct. 2288.

62

Compare Standard 7(d) with NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10312 and NYSE Arbitration Rules,
Rule 610.

63

Compare California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2(a)(6) with NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure,
Rules 10309-10313 and NYSE Arbitration Rules, Rules 608-611.

64

258 F.Supp.2d at 1110.
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specialized nature of securities arbitration and that application of the New Ethics Rules to SROs
would exert an “extraneous pull” on the regulatory scheme established by Congress.65 The
plaintiff thus had no right to require that NYSE or its arbitrators comply with the New Ethics
Rules and was not relieved of his contractual obligation to arbitrate the dispute in accordance
with its arbitration rules.
(4)

Jevne Case

Following close on the heels of the Mayo decision, in November 2003 a California court
of appeal addressed the issue of whether the New Ethics Rules were preempted by the Exchange
Act in Jevne v. Superior Court.66 In Jevne, investors filed an action in state court in the summer
of 2000 against a brokerage firm alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and conversion.
Defendants responded with a motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in
an agreement relating to one of the investment accounts in issue. The provision required all
disputes arising out of the relationship between the parties to be settled through binding
arbitration in accordance with the rules and procedures of the NASD. Plaintiffs did not oppose
the motion to compel and, in February 2001, the court granted the motion. Thereafter, in May
2001, the parties signed a Uniform Submission Agreement memorializing their agreement to
have the arbitration conducted in accordance with NASD rules and overseen by NASD’s
Director of Arbitration. During the summer of 2001, the parties selected a three-arbitrator panel
and arbitration was commenced in early 2002. In October 2002, one of the arbitrators
voluntarily recused himself. By that time, the NASD had stopped appointing arbitrators in
NASD arbitrations in California and, accordingly, informed plaintiffs that it would not appoint a
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258 F.Supp.2d at 1111-1112.

66

(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 486, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, review granted.
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replacement arbitrator unless they agreed to waive the New Ethics Rules or agreed to have the
arbitration conducted in another state. Plaintiffs would not agree to the waiver and instead filed
a motion in the state court for an order setting aside the court’s prior order compelling binding
arbitration and restoring the matter to the civil trial calendar. Plaintiffs argued that the New
Ethics Rules governed the NASD arbitration and that the agreement to arbitrate was no longer
enforceable because the NASD refused to proceed with the arbitration without a waiver of the
New Ethics Rules. The state trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion concluding, in essence, that
federal law preempted the New Ethics Rules. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of mandate
with the court of appeal which, in turn, issued an order to show cause.
On review by the state court of appeal, one of the issues raised was whether the New
Ethics Rules were preempted by the Exchange Act.67 Because no California state court had yet
addressed this issue68 and because of its “far reaching implications for the general public,” the
court of appeal invited amici curiae briefing from the NASD and NYSE, the SEC, the California
Attorney General and the Judicial Council of California on the issue of federal conflict
preemption.69 In this regard, the court of appeal noted that because Congress has provided for
concurrent state regulation of securities,70 there was no express or field preemption under the
federal securities laws of the New Ethics Rules,71 and only conflict preemption was implicated in

67

6 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 547-548.

68

Id., fn. 2, citing Alan v. Superior Court (UBS Painewebber, Inc.) (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 217, 231, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d
344, where federal preemption was raised but, because the NASD was not a party in the case and had not filed an
amicus curiae brief, the court deferred decision on that issue to other civil actions in which the NASD was an active
participant.

69

6 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 554.

70

15 U.S.C. § 77r.

71

6 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 554, citing, Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 345, 352,
95 Cal.Rptr. 258 (state law remedies and regulations available under California Business and Professions Code
Section 17200 supplement federal securities law).
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the case.72 The court of appeal then found that there was an actual conflict between the New
Ethics Rules73 and the NASD rules74 concerning arbitrator disqualification. Under Standard 10,
an arbitrator is disqualified when a party files a notice with the court, and assuming the arbitrator
fails to disqualify himself or herself upon learning the challenge, the superior court will make the
ultimate decision on disqualification. In contrast, under the NASD rules, the Director of
Arbitration has the final say on any challenge for cause or any determination that a conflict of
interest warranting disqualification exists. The court of appeal thus held that there was “no
reconciling the conflict between the [New Ethics Rules] and the NASD Rules; it is simply
impossible to comply with both of them.”75
The court of appeal in Jevne also addressed the conflicts between the disclosures required
under Standard 7 of the New Ethics Rules76 and those required under the NASD rules.77 In the
court’s view, the New Ethics Rules were “simply more detailed than the NASD disclosure rules,
which in itself does not make it impossible for parties, and in particular arbitrators, to comply
with both sets of rules;”78 that a “difference in drafting philosophy does not present a physical
conflict requiring preemption.”79 However, the lack of an actual conflict did not end the court’s

72

Id.

73

CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 10.

74

NASD Code of Arbitration Rules 10308-10313.

75

118 Cal.App.4th 486, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 555.

76

CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 7(d).

77

NASD Code of Arbitration Rules 10312(a).

78

113 Cal.App.4th 486, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 542, 558.

79

Id. On this point, the court of appeal noted that its conclusion differed from that of the Mayo court, but reasoned
that the Mayo decision only had persuasive value and was not binding precedent for California state court. Id.,
citing, Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 830, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604.
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inquiry and, ultimately, the court found that Standard 7 “stands as an obstacle to the Exchange
Act,” and was thus preempted.80
(5)

Grunwald Case

Most recently, the Ninth Circuit handed down an expedited decision in Credit Suisse
First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald81 and held that while NASD arbitrators come within the
definition of “neutral arbitrators” under the New Ethics Rules, the Exchange Act preempts
application of those rules to NASD-appointed arbitrators. Grunwald involved an employment
dispute between Scott Grunwald and his former employer, Credit Suisse First Boston (“CSFB”).
After CSFB terminated Grunwald, he exhausted CSFB’s internal grievance procedures and
participated in a mediation through JAMS/Endispute, which were the initial steps required by
CSFB’s dispute resolution program. Grunwald then filed a demand for arbitration with AAA.
CSFB successfully obtained a preliminary injunction in district court that enjoined Grunwald
from arbitrating before AAA because CSFB’s dispute resolution program required employees
registered with NASD – like Grunwald – to arbitrate before an arbitration panel appointed by
NASD. Grunwald then filed a demand for arbitration with NASD. Before the NASD appointed
Grunwald’s arbitration panel, the New Ethics Rules were adopted and, similar to the facts in
Mayo involving arbitration before the NYSE, the NASD refused to appoint a panel of arbitrators
in California unless Grunwald waived the application of the New Ethics Rules or agreed to an
80

Id., citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council supra, 530 U.S. 363, 372, the court of appeal noted that
“[p]reemption may be found either where a state law conflicts with a federal law or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the federal law.” (Emphasis in original.) The court went on to note that the SEC had concluded that
allowing California arbitrations to be administered under a different set of rules would introduce inconsistency into
the process and would thus undermine the national system of SRO arbitrations. In light of the SEC’s “intense
oversight” in the area of SRO arbitrations, the court was reluctant to “second guess the SEC’s determination” and
felt “compelled to defer to the agency’s judgment.” Id., at 560, citing Greier v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc.
(2000) 529 U.S. 861, 883, 146 L.Ed.2d 914, 120 S.Ct. 1913; Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. (9th Cir. 1988)
841 F.2d 282, 286.
81

2005 WL 466202 (March 1, 2005).
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out-of-state arbitration. Grunwald refused to waive the New Ethics Rules and declined the
NASD’s offer to proceed with arbitration outside California. He then filed a motion with the
district court seeking modification or dissolution of the injunction order so that he could re-file
his claims in state court or proceed to arbitration before AAA. That motion was denied based on
the district court’s findings that the New Ethics Rules do not apply to NASD arbitrators and that
he could obtain a speedy and expeditious arbitration by submitting to arbitration outside
California or by waiving application of the New Ethics Rules. Grunwald took the matter up on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit viewed the issue presented as whether SRO rules can
preempt conflicting state laws even though they are rules adopted and enforced by private
organizations. On that issue, this was a case of first impression.82 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that in light of the Ware decision and the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, which removed
the original statute’s requirement that all SRO rules be consistent with “the applicable laws of
the State in which [the exchange] is located,” the SRO rules approved by the Exchange
Commission83 had preemptive force and would preempt the New Ethics Rules if they were found
to be in conflict with the NASD arbitration disclosure rules.84

82

In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware (1973) 414 U.S. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 348, 94 S.Ct. 383, the
Supreme Court had only suggested by implication that SRO rules can in certain circumstances have preemptive
force (conflicting state law “should be preempted by exchange self-regulation ‘only to the extent necessary to
protect the achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act.’” Id. at 127, quoting Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange (1963) 373 U.S. 341, 361, 10 L.Ed.2d 389, 83 S.Ct. 1246.
83

The ultimate approval of a proposed SRO rule reflects the determination by the Exchange Commission that a
rule is consistent with the purposes of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, supra, 482 US.. 220, 223 (“No proposed rule change may take effect unless the SEC finds that the
proposed rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act.” Additionally, the 1975 amendments to the
Exchange Act gave the Exchange Commission the power to abrogate, add to and delete from the rules of any SRO
“as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration” of the SRO. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(c).
84

Grunwald, 2005 WL 477202, p. 7.

18

The Ninth Circuit found that the New Ethics Rules did conflict with the NASD
arbitration disclosure rules and, as such were preempted. First, the court found that the NASD
could not simultaneously comply with the disqualification rules of both the NASD and the New
Ethics Rules. Under the New Ethics Rules, if an arbitrator fails to make a required disclosure or
makes a disclosure which a party finds objectionable, that arbitrator is subject to mandatory and
automatic disqualification once a party serves a timely notice of disqualification.85 If the
arbitrator fails to remove himself or herself from the panel, the arbitration award is then subject
to mandatory vacatur.86 In contrast, the NASD rules provide that the Director of Arbitration
“may” remove an arbitrator if he or she fails to make a required disclosure.87 Thus, the New
Ethics Rules require disqualification once a party serves a notice of disqualification, while the
NASD rules grant discretion to the NASD Director of Arbitration to decide whether an arbitrator
should be disqualified.88 Application of the New Ethics Rules “would strip the Director of
Arbitration of his federally-recognized obligation to make a determination whether an arbitrator
should in fact be disqualified.”89
Next, the court found that in contrast to the disqualification rules, it was not physically
impossible for an arbitrator to simultaneously comply with the New Ethics Rules and the rules
governing NASD arbitrations. “Nothing in the NASD Code prevents an arbitrator from

85

CRC, Appendix, Div. VI, Std. 10(a)(1).

86

Cal. C. Civ. Proc. § 1286.2(a)(6).

87

NASD Code of Arbitration Rule 10308(d)(2).

88

2005 WL 477202, p. 11.

89

Id.
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disclosing more information than is required by the NASD Code’s disclosure rule.”90 The court
concluded, however, that the second type of conflict preemption – frustration of purpose –
applied and accepted the position of the Commission that the application of the New Ethics
Rules to NASD arbitrations “would frustrate the objectives of the Exchange Act.”91
(6)

Conclusion

Disputes arising under customer and employment contracts in the securities industry
seem to be directly analogous to disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements because
(a) both are governed by federal law representing national policy for important aspects of
interstate commerce which should be consistently applied on a nationwide basis, and (b) both
have their own government-sanctioned dispute resolution tribunals and rules. Based on the fact
that both the state and federal courts which have addressed the issue of federal securities law
preemption have concluded that the New Ethics Rules do indeed conflict with NYSE and NASD
regulatory scheme established by Congress, it is probably only a matter of time before there is a
definitive decision on this issue by the United States Supreme Court and possibly even the
California Supreme Court if the California Legislature does not take action to amend the New
Ethics Rules to except NASD and NYSE arbitrators from compliance with the new ethics
standards. Given the depth of reasoning in the Mayo, Jevne and Grunwald cases discussed
above and the “failure of forum” problem discussed in Section 3(C) below, it is surprising that
the California Legislature has persisted in this standoff and, to date, has refused to amend the
90

Id., citing NASD Code of Arbitration Rule 10312(a) and North Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n (9th Cir. 1983)
720 F.2d 578, 583 (“While the state standards are more stringent than the federal standards, it is possible to comply
with both.”)
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2005 W. 477202, p. 12, citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 496, 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 116 S.Ct.
2240 (“[b]ecause the [Commission] is the federal agency to which Congress has delegated its authority to implement
the provisions of the [Exchange Act], the agency is uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of
state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”).
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New Ethics Rules to grant an exception to neutral arbitrators hearing disputes under the
Exchange Act who are appointed by the NYSE or NASD arbitration tribunals.
B.

Federal Arbitration Act Preemption Challenges
(1)

Backdrop

The FAA was enacted in 1925 and declares a national policy favoring arbitration of
disputes.92 Its purpose was “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts,
and to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts.”93 In order for an
agreement to arbitrate to be subject to the FAA, the agreement itself must involve a “maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.94 The FAA requires
courts to enforce arbitration agreements and leaves no room for the exercise of discretion, unless
there is a ground to revoke the agreement.95 In a series of decisions handed down since 1983, the
Supreme Court has construed the FAA as a federal declaration of pro-arbitration public policy
that preempts contrary state law.96

92

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 56, 131 L.Ed.2d 76, 115 S.Ct. 1212.

93

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20, 24, 114 L.Ed.2d 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647; Volt, supra,
489 U.S. 468, 474..
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9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 of the FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitrate in any contract involving
interstate commerce or a maritime transaction “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Section 1 of the FAA then defines “commerce” as
“commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory or another, or between any such Territory and any State or
foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation,” and expressly
excludes application to employment contracts of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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9 U.S.C. § 4; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218, 84 L.Ed.2d 158, 105 S.Ct. 1238; see
also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 432 U.S. 105, 112, 149 L.Ed.2d 234, 121 S.Ct. 1302.
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Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, 2001 J. Disp. Resol. 67, 68 (“Hayford Article”); see also, Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483,
489, 96 L.Ed.2d 426, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural rules to the contrary.”).
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FAA preemption has been defined by six recent Supreme Court opinions which spring
from the Court’s earlier opinions in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp.,97 and
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.98 In those cases, the Supreme
Court stated its belief that the FAA is an exercise of the Commerce Clause authority creating a
body of federal substantive law governing arbitration, applicable in both the federal and state
courts.99 There are two dimensions to the law of preemption:100 The first concerns state law
which is found to conflict with the FAA and is represented by Southland Corp. v. Keating,101
Perry v. Thomas,102 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson103 and Doctor’s Associates v.
Casarotto.104 The second concerns interpretation of the parties’ contractual agreements to
arbitrate in the course of determining the effect of those agreements on the state law-FAA
preemption interaction,105 and is embodied in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University106 and Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc.107
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(1967) 388 U.S. 395, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270, 87 S.Ct. 1801.

98

(1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24, 74 L.Ed.2d 765, 103 S.Ct. 927.
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Hayford Article, supra, p. 69.

100

Id. at p. 69.

101

465 U.S. 1.

102

482 U.S. 483.

103

(1995) 513 U.S. 265, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753.

104

(1996) 517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902.

105

Hayford Article, supra, p. 69.
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(1989) 489 U.S. 468, 103 L.Ed.2d 488, 109 S.Ct. 1248.
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(1995) 514 U.S. 52, 131 L.Ed.2d 76, 115 S.Ct. 121.
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The FAA itself contains no express preemptive provisions, nor does it reflect a
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.108 Likewise, the FAA does not
represent a federal policy of favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules.109 States
are free to establish their own arbitration rules and procedures even where the controversy is
governed by federal substantive law.110 State laws concerning arbitration are only preempted to
the extent that they conflict with congressional intent to favor the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.111 In this regard, state laws may be preempted to the extent that they actually
conflict with federal law or stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”112
As a general rule, state laws that single out arbitration agreements for special scrutiny in
terms of enforceability or suspect status have been viewed as inhospitable to arbitration and
routinely have been found to be preempted under the FAA.113 State laws that are not antiarbitration are not automatically preempted under the FAA. In this regard, the Supreme Court
has specifically recognized California’s procedures and rules governing arbitration as being
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Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 477.

109

Id. at 467-477.
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Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 138, 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 108 S.Ct. 2302.

111

Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 477.
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Id., quoting Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67, 85 L.Ed. 581, 61 S.Ct. 399; see also Southland, supra,
465 U.S. 1, 16; Perry v. Thomas, supra, 482 U.S. at 489-490.
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See, e.g., Doctor’s Associates, supra, 517 U.S. 681 (preempting Montana law which invalidated arbitration
agreements unless they contained special notice placed on first page of the agreement); Allied-Bruce, supra, 513
U.S. 265, 270 (preempting Alabama law which invalidated predispute arbitration agreements); Southland, supra,
465 U.S. 1 (preempting California law which invalidated arbitration agreements between franchisors and
franchisees).
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“designed to encourage resort to the arbitration process” and not to conflict with “any policy
embodied in the FAA.”114
Prior to the enactment of the New Ethics Rules, the law was clear that there was no
federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; that federal policy was
directed at simply ensuring “the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate.”115 In the cases discussed below, the courts were asked to determine whether the FAA
preempted the New Ethics Rules and thus made them legally ineffective in arbitrations subject to
the FAA, potentially reaching far beyond the securities arbitrations discussed in Section A,
above.
(2)

Mayo Case

As discussed in Section A, above, in April 2003, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California was asked to decide whether the New Ethics Rules apply to SRO
arbitrators in California.116 In addition to the preemption challenge under the Exchange Act, the
court was also ask to determine whether the New Ethics Rules were preempted under the
FAA.117 In ruling on this issue, the court adopted the contract analysis seen in Volt and held that
under the FAA, the defendant (Morgan Stanley) had a right to enforce the arbitration agreement
according to its terms, which terms provided for arbitration before the NYSE in accordance with

114

Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 476.

115

Mastrubuono, supra, 514 U.S. 52, 66, quoting Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 476. “Indeed, short of authorizing trial
by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures
they want to govern the arbitration of their disputes.” Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc. (7th Cir. 1994) 28
F.3d 704, 709.
116

Mayo, supra, 258 F.Supp.2d 1097.

117

Id. at 1112-1116.
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NYSE arbitration rules.118 The court thus determined that application of the New Ethics Rules
“would impose inconsistent and conflicting procedural rules upon those specifically agreed upon
by the parties.”119 Because such a result is impermissible under the FAA, the court held that the
New Ethics Rules “at least as applied here, conflict with the FAA and the federal policy
embedded therein.”120 On this point, the court rejected the California Attorney General’s
argument that the New Ethics Rules do not offend any principle of the FAA because the
Supreme Court had previously stated in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co.121 that it could “perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process [would]
be hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that
might create an impression of possible bias.”122 The court found that the New Ethics Rules “do a
great deal more than require additional disclosure” and that preemption is not precluded just
because the New Ethics Rules and the FAA may share similar goals.123 The turning point in the
court’s analysis was the specific agreement of the parties to submit to arbitration before the
NYSE in accordance with its rules. Significantly, the court did not determine that the New
Ethics Rules conflicted directly with the FAA. The court was careful to limit its ruling to the
circumstances and issues presented by plaintiff’s dispute with Morgan Stanley: namely, the
terms of those parties’ pre-dispute arbitration agreement.124
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Id. at 1114.
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Id.
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Id.
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(1968) 393 U.S. 145, 21 L.Ed.2d 301, 89 S.Ct. 337.
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Id. at 149.
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258 F.Supp.2d at 1114.
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Id. at 1115-1116.
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(2)

Jevne Case

As discussed in Section A, above, in November 2003 the California court of appeal was
asked to decide whether the New Ethics Rules apply to SRO arbitrators in California.125 Unlike
Mayo, the court in Jevne first addressed whether the New Ethics Rules were preempted under the
FAA before addressing preemption under the Exchange Act.126 In Jevne, it was argued that the
FAA preempted the New Ethics Rules because they applied only to arbitration contracts and
imposed terms which differed from those in the parties’ arbitration agreement. The Court noted
that state laws concerning arbitration are only preempted to the extent that they conflict with
congressional intent to favor the enforcement of arbitration agreements; that state laws that are
not anti-arbitration or antagonistic to the process are not automatically preempted by the FAA
even though the state law relates only to arbitration agreements; and that the Supreme Court has
previously recognized that California’s procedures and rules governing arbitration “are
manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process,” do not conflict with “any policy
emobodied in the FAA” and “generally foster the federal policy favoring arbitration.”127 The
court found that the New Ethics Rules were “consistent with the other California arbitration
procedures the Volt court endorsed” and rejected the general preemption argument.128
It was also argued in Jevne that the New Ethics Rules were preempted by the FAA as
applied to the facts of that particular case because the New Ethics Rules differ from the NASD
arbitration procedures specifically agreed to by the parties in their arbitration agreement. The
real parties in interest argued that under the FAA they are entitled to have the arbitration
125

Mayo, supra, 258 F.Supp.2d 1097.

126

6 Cal.Rptr. 542, 551.
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Id. at 552, citing Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at 476.
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Id. at 552, citing Commonwealth, supra, 393 U.S. at 149.
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agreement enforced according to its terms. The real parties in interest argued that Jevne’s efforts
to avoid arbitration altogether based on the New Ethics Rules must fail because an arbitration
agreement subject to the FAA may be invalidated only on legal or equitable grounds applying to
the revocation of any contract.129 While the court agreed that some question remained as to
whether the New Ethics Rules were preempted as a matter of fact, it declined to reach that issue
in view of its conclusion that the New Ethics Rules were preempted by the Exchange Act.130
4.

Conclusion

Jevne and Mayo represent two different approaches to the FAA preemption issue and two
different outcomes. The Mayo decision found preemption under the FAA as a matter of fact,
based upon the court’s interpretation of and reference to the parties’ contract which provided for
arbitration before the NYSE in accordance with its rules. In order to enforce the parties’
agreement to arbitrate before their selected tribunal, the court had to respect the rules of that
tribunal which the court had already found were preempted by the Exchange Act, and in this
context found preemption under the FAA. Significantly, the Mayo court did not determine that
the New Ethics Rules conflicted directly with the FAA. The Jevne decision is thus important
because it did address the issue of whether the New Ethics Rules conflict directly with the FAA
and concluded that they do not, at least with respect to the disclosure requirements.
C.

Impossibility and Other Contract Defense Challenges

Under Section 2 of the FAA, an agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, as a matter of federal law, except upon such grounds as exist as defenses to the
validity or enforceability of contracts generally. A state law principle that takes it meaning

129

Id. at 552, fn. 8, citing 9 U.S.C. § 2; Southland, supra, 465 U.S. 1, 10.

130

Id. at 552, fn. 8
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precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with Section 2 of
the FAA.131 In assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, the court may
not construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes
nonarbitration agreements under state law, nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.132
The first reported decision to address challenges to the New Ethics Rules in the context
of contract defense challenges was Alan v. Superior Court (USB Painewebber, Inc.)133 decided in
August 2003 by Division 1 of the California Court of Appeal, Second District. In Alan, the court
was asked to interpret the arbitration provisions contained in the parties’ customer agreement and
decide whether the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable in view of the NASD’s refusal to
provide an arbitral forum in California: i.e., could plaintiff be excused from his obligation to
arbitrate based on NASD’s refusal to perform?134 The Alan case started with plaintiff bringing a
civil action in state court even though the customer agreement required him to arbitrate before
NASD, NYSE or another national securities exchange. The customer agreement provided that if
the investor failed to select the arbitral forum, the brokerage firm could select the arbitral
forum.135 In response to the lawsuit, the defendants filed a motion seeking an order compelling
the plaintiff to arbitrate the dispute and staying the state court action. Because the plaintiff had
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Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 492-493, fn. 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 426, 107 S.Ct. 2520.
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Id.; see also Thomas v. Perry (1988) 200 Cal.App.3 510, 514-515, 246 Cal.Rptr. 156 (argument that the NYSE
rules for selection of an arbitrator are unfair is clearly the type addressed to the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate).
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(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 217, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 377.
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Alan, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 217. The court was also asked to determine that the New Ethics Rules were
preempted by federal law. Because the NASD was not a party to the writ proceedings, the court refused to address
this argument as raised by defendants. Id. at 231.
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not selected an arbitral forum, the defendants designated the NASD as the arbitral forum.136 The
trial court granted defendant’s motion and ordered the plaintiff to proceed to arbitration before
the NASD, disregarding plaintiff’s claim that the NASD was no longer appointing arbitrators in
California as a result of the dispute concerning the application of the New Ethics Rules to SROs,
as discussed in Section 3(A), above.137
Without submitting the matter to the NASD, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of
mandate to the California Court of Appeal. Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate was granted
based on the court’s finding that (a) because the customer agreement required all arbitrations to
be conducted in a forum convened by, and subject to the rules of, the chosen SRO, and (b)
because the NASD and NYSE were no longer convening arbitrations in California, it was
impossible to enforce the agreement to arbitrate because there was a failure of forum.138 The
court rejected defendants’ argument that the trial court could appoint an arbitrator under
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.6139 in the absence of the NASD doing so,
finding that because the parties agreement to arbitrate designated the NASD as the arbitral
forum, only its arbitrators – not an arbitrator outside the NASD – could be appointed to hear the
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Id. at 223.
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Section 1281.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure states: “If the arbitration agreement provides a
method of appointing an arbitrator, that method shall be followed. If the arbitration agreement does not provide a
method for appointing an arbitrator, the parties to the agreement who seek arbitration and against whom arbitration
is sought may agree on a method of appointing an arbitrator and that method shall be followed. In the absence of an
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matter in accordance with NASD rules.140 While acknowledging that it was consistent under
both the California Arbitration Act and the FAA for the court to appoint an arbitrator if that was
the obstacle to convening an arbitration,141 the court found that its appointment of an arbitrator
was “not an adequate alternative to an NASD forum.”142
The case was remanded to the trial court to decide whether any out-of-state location
selected by NASD was a reasonable and proper forum to hear the dispute. In this regard, the
defendants argued that plaintiff had no legitimate grounds to complain about being forced to
attend an arbitration in another state because the forum selection clause in the NASD rules allow
the NASD to conduct the hearing in any location it chooses.143 The court held that defendants’
interpretation of the NASD Code of Arbitration was “open to challenge” because the case law is
clear that a court may set aside a forum-selection clause if enforcement would be unreasonable
or unjust or if proceedings in the contractual forum would be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that the resisting party would for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court.144 The court concluded by remanding the case back to the trial court to decide whether the
out-of-state location selected by NASD was proper, stating that “[i]f the out-of-state location is
140

111 Cal.App.4th at 224-227, citing, In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Lit. (2d Cir. 1995) 68 F.3d 554
(failure of NYSE forum due to the NYSE’s decision that the disputed should not be arbitrated, which was within its
discretion to do).
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Id. at 228-229, citing, Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. (11th Cir. 2000) 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (arbitration
may proceed in forum not mentioned in arbitration clause where choice of arbitral forum was not an integral part of
the agreement); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1107, 228
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S.Ct. 3346; Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson (8th Cir. 2001) 248 F.3d 720, 726; Hayes Children
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(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 900, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 888; Wilmot v. McNabb (N.D.Cal. 2003) 269 F.Supp.2d 1203.
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proper, the dispute should be resolved through arbitration there. If the out-of-state location is not
proper, the dispute should be resolved here and … should be adjudicated in court.”145
On remand, the trial court concluded: (1) the New Ethics Rules were preempted by
federal law; (2) the New Ethics Rules could not be applied retroactively to modify or amend any
provision of the client agreements; and (3) by agreeing to arbitrate future disputes before the
NASD according to the rules of the NASD, plaintiff prospectively waived the applicability of the
New Ethics Rules.146 The trial court thus renewed its order directing the matter back to
arbitration.147 Plaintiff filed a “Statement of Claim” with the NASD and paid the required filing
fee, but the NASD would not assign a location for the hearing unless plaintiff first waived any
objection to the location. Plaintiff refused to give such a waiver in order to preserve his right to
return to the trial court. Given this deadlock, the NASD closed the case without hearing and
without prejudice. Plaintiff then returned to the trial court and filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order directing the matter to arbitration, arguing that because the NASD refused to
adjudicate the matter absent a waiver, there was a failure of arbitral forum and the case should be
tried in court. The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration but, upon reconsideration,
concluded that the matter should be arbitrated. However, because the NASD refused to convene
an arbitration without a waiver from plaintiff, which plaintiff would not give, the suit was in
limbo.148 Plaintiff then filed a second petition with the California Court of Appeal for a
peremptory writ of mandate.149
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In the second appeal, the court rejected defendants’ contention that arbitration was
required because the trial court had resolved the preemption, retroactivity and prospective waiver
issues in their favor because -- despite those rulings -- the NASD “was not influenced” and “still
refused to arbitrate the dispute.”150 The appellate court determined that the dispute “is to be tried
in court” because the NASD, the forum selected by the defendants, refused to hear the matter and
was “not willing to conduct arbitrations in California, absent a signed waiver, until the pending
litigation – in the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and possibly the United States
Supreme Court – is final.”151 The appellate court concluded that there was thus not “a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law.” The trial court was instructed to vacate the orders
compelling arbitration and to restore the case to the civil active list for trial.152
Since the Alan case was first reported in 2003, there have been a number of cases, mostly
unreported, where plaintiffs sought to avoid their contractual obligations to arbitrate securities
disputes through various contract defense attacks similar to that raised in Alan.153 The only case
to follow Alan was a decision reported by Division 6 of the Second District of the California
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Court of Appeal shortly after Alan was reported.154 The balance of the cases have rejected or
distinguished Alan on federal law preemption grounds, relying on the decisions in Mayo and
Jevne which were reported after the first Alan decision,155 have granted the brokerage firms’
motions to compel arbitration, and have found no problem with the NYSE and NASD rules
excepting their arbitrators from compliance with the New Ethics Rules and requiring plaintiffs to
waive the New Ethics Rules for an arbitration in California or consent to arbitration in an out-ofstate forum.
As applied to securities arbitrations, the “failure of forum” challenges discussed in this
section are disconcerting because even though ordered to arbitration, the arbitrations have not
been convened and the parties’ disputes have not been resolved due to the impasse between the
California Legislature and the NASD / NYSE as to whether or not the NASD / NYSE arbitrators
should be subject to the New Ethics Rules. This situation is completely at odds with the concept
that private arbitration provides the parties with quicker results than what is available in court
and with shorter and less costly proceedings. The cases discussed in this section illustrate that
the stalemate concerning the application of the New Ethics Rules to securities arbitrations has
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had the opposite result: the parties have been involved in costly and protracted legal proceedings
and been unable to convene – let alone conclude – their arbitrations.
D.

Enforcement and Application

Thus far, there has been only one reported decision in which the New Ethics Rules have
been applied, rather than challenged. That case is Azteca Construction, Inc. v. ADR Consulting,
Inc.,156 and was decided by the Third District of the California Court of Appeal in September
2004. In Azteca, the parties’ agreement included a provision for private arbitration of any
disputes in accordance with the AAA’s then entitled “Construction Industry Dispute Resolution
Procedures” (the “AAA Rules”). A dispute arose in October 2002 and ADR served a demand on
Azteca Construction for arbitration in accordance with the AAA Rules. Because the parties were
unable to agree on a neutral arbitrator from the AAA list, the AAA proposed the arbitrator, an
attorney names Paul Taylor. Taylor timely made the disclosures required under the New Ethics
Rules in November 2002. In accordance with AAA Rules forbidding any type of direct contact
between the arbitrator and the parties or counsel before the arbitration hearing, those disclosures
were communicated through AAA.
Taylor’s disclosure statement revealed that he had, within the past five years, served as a
neutral arbitrator on matters in which ADR Consulting’s attorney had represented one or more
parties. Taylor also disclosed that in 1985 he had had a prior relationship with ADR
Consulting’s attorney. Finally, Taylor disclosed that a conflicts check run by the law firm to
which he was “of counsel” reported a case in which Azteca Construction was listed as a potential
adverse party to one of the law firm’s clients on a matter not involving Taylor. In response to
Taylor’s disclosures, Azteca Construction timely objected to Taylor’s appointment via a letter
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(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1156, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 142.

34

sent to AAA. Azteca Construction requested that Taylor be removed as arbitrator based on his
disclosed relationship with ADR Consulting’s attorney. AAA investigated the objection and
determined that Taylor should not be disqualified. It then notified the parties that Taylor’s
appointment was being reaffirmed.
An arbitration hearing was conducted in March 2003. At the conclusion of the
arbitration, Taylor rendered an interim award in favor of ADR Consulting for $39,140 plus the
costs of the arbitration. Azteca Construction again objected to Taylor’s appointment as arbitrator
and requested that Taylor disqualify himself. AAA again responded to the objection and
reasserted its authority under AAA Rule R-20(b) to adjudicate and determine any objection to
Taylor’s continued service. Taylor then issued a final award in April 2003. Not surprisingly,
Azteca Construction responded by filing a petition with the court seeking to vacate the final
award, claiming that Taylor was required to disqualify himself upon timely receipt of Azteca
Constructions’ objection based upon Section 1281.91 (b)(1) and (d) and the New Ethics Rules.
The court denied the petition based upon its finding that by agreeing to arbitration in
conformance with the AAA Rules, which granted AAA conclusive authority over challenges to
arbitrators, Azteca Construction had waived the right to disqualify Taylor under the California
Arbitration Act provisions.
Azteca Construction appealed and, in a very well reasoned opinion surveying California
arbitration law, the trial court was reversed. In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court of
Appeal found that the provisions of the California Arbitration Act relating to arbitrator
disqualification could not be waived because those statutory provisions were “enacted primarily
for a public purpose.”157 In this regard, the Court of Appeal found that AAA Rule R-20(b) “must
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yield to the disqualification scheme set forth in sections 1281.9 and 1281.91, for a number of
reasons.”158 Among those reasons was the finding that the neutrality of the arbitrator is of
crucial importance to the private arbitration process and that the California Supreme Court has
heretofore termed the requirement of a neutral arbitrator “essential to ensuring the integrity of the
arbitration process.”159 The court’s reasoning was sound. Participants who agree to binding
arbitration are giving up constitutional rights to a jury trial and appeal. Duties of disclosure and
disqualification are thus designed to ensure an arbitrator’s impartiality.160 As stated by the
California Court of Appeal in Britz, Inc. v. Alfa-Laval Food & Dairy Co.,161 even though state
and federal policy favors private arbitration and the AAA is a respected provider of arbitration
services, “AAA nevertheless is a business enterprise ‘in competition not only with other private
arbitration services but with the courts in providing” and selling dispute resolution services.162
As such, the court found that “[o]nly by adherence to the Act’s prophylactic remedies can the
parties have confidence that neutrality has not taken a back seat to expediency.”163
Having determined that the New Ethics Rules and right to disqualification for violation of
the New Ethics Rules could not be waived, the Court of Appeal was then required to apply the
law to the facts presented in the Azteca case. The appellate court very simply and succinctly
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determined that Taylor should have been disqualified before the arbitration began since Azteca
Construction had properly and timely exercised its right to remove him under Section 1281.91 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure based on his disclosures concerning his prior relationship
with ADR Consultants’ counsel.164 In this regard, the Court of Appeal concluded that Azteca
Construction could not waive its statutory rights to disqualify an arbitrator by agreeing to submit
to arbitration before the AAA. It also found that in resolving Azteca Construction’s objection to
Taylor, the AAA was required to follow Sections 2381.9 and 2381.91 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeal in Azteca found that Azteca Construction, as the party challenging
the arbitrator’s appointment, “had no independent burden to demonstrate that a reasonable
person would doubt Taylor’s capacity to be impartial. … The Legislature has already determined
that any of the matters required to be disclosed … necessarily satisfies that standard.”165 It thus
concluded that Azteca Construction’s timely demand for disqualification of the proposed
arbitrator “had the same practical effect as a timely peremptory challenge to a superior court
judge” and is automatic.166 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s order
denying Azteca Construction’s petition to vacate the arbitration award with directions to enter a
new order granting the petition to vacate the award.167
The discussion in the Azteca decision about arbitrator disclosures and disqualification is
misleading because it starts with a summary of the revisions to “the disclosure requirements and
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procedures for disqualifying arbitrators” as amended by SB 475168 and suggests that the
disclosure requirements and disqualification procedures at issue in the case were new. They
were not. For example, under Section 1281.9(a)(4), Taylor was obligated to disclose the prior
cases in which he had served as a neutral arbitrator and in which any of the current parties or
their attorneys were involved. Although it has been renumbered over the years, that disclosure
requirement has been on the books since Section 1281.9 was originally enacted in 1994.
Likewise, the right of a party to disqualify a proposed appointee by serving a notice of
disqualification within 15 days after service of the disclosure statement has been on the books
since Section 1281.9 was originally enacted, and the right to vacatur where the arbitrator making
the award was subject to disqualification but failed, upon receipt of a timely demand, to
disqualify himself or herself has been on the books since 1997. What the Azteca decision
illustrates is that the concerns which prompted the California Legislature to enact the New Ethics
Rules legislation was justified: that AAA, through its rules and its procedures, had supplanted
the clear statutory right of the parties to disqualify an arbitrator based upon his or her disclosures.
4.

Controversies Created By The New Ethics Rules Case
A.

Should Private Arbitrators be Held to the Same Standards as
Judges?

With the exception of the Azteca case, what is really interesting about the cases discussed
above is that the arguments in those cases centered largely around the ethical standards adopted
by the Judicial Council pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.85 and have
not addressed the bigger issue of whether private arbitrators should be held to the same standards
of disclosure and disqualification as state court judges, which is what is statutorily mandated
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under California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1281.9(a)(1) and 1281.91(d). It is hard to
argue against such disclosure and disqualification standards given the breadth of disputes
resolved in arbitral fora which places arbitration on par with the courts in terms of the types of
civil disputes heard and decided.
Both federal and state courts are authorized to enforce agreements to arbitrate, and there
is a strong public policy in favor of doing so.169 Nevertheless, until recently, courts were
reluctant to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements to compel arbitration of claims created by
statute, rather than those created by virtue of the parties’ contract. This reluctance was based on
the courts’ view that the legislative intent in creating a statutory right would be frustrated if that
right was not effectively enforced, and on the concurrent belief that effective enforcement could
only be obtained through the courts. For example, in Wilko v. Swan, 170 the Supreme Court
expressed concern that arbitrators in statutorily based cases must make legal determinations
“without judicial instruction on the law” and that an arbitration award “may be made without
explanation of [the arbitrator’s] reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings.”171
The Supreme Court also noted that the “power to vacate an award is limited” and that
“interpretations of the law by the arbitrators, in contrast to manifest disregard, are not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”172 The Supreme Court
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Both the FAA and the Uniform Arbitration Act make agreements to arbitrate specifically enforceable. There is
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concluded that in view of these drawbacks to arbitration, the plaintiff’s claims under the
Exchange Act should not be ordered to arbitration.173
In a series of cases beginning in 1985, the Supreme Court has moved away from the
Wilko standard and adopted a strong pro-arbitration position allowing compelled arbitration of
statutory claims. This approach began with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,174 where the Court held that a pre-dispute arbitration
clause in a sales agreement would be enforceable for purposes of compelling arbitration of one
party’s antitrust claims against the other.175 In 1987, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,176 the Court held that a pre-dispute arbitration clause contained in an investor’s
customer agreement with the brokerage firm would be enforceable for purposes of compelling
arbitration of the investor’s claims against the brokerage firm that it had violated both the
Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In 1989, in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,177 the Court held that a pre-dispute
arbitration clause contained in investors’ customer agreements with the brokerage firm would be
enforceable for purposes of compelling arbitration of the investor’s claims that the brokerage
firm had violated the Exchange Act and expressly overruled Wilko.178 In each of these cases, the
Supreme Court took the position that while Congress could prohibit the arbitration of statutebased claims, in the absence of clear evidence of such a prohibition in the statute’s text or
173
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178

“… Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal
statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions.” Id. at 482.
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legislative history, arbitration would be barred only on a showing that there exists an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purpose; that arbitration will not be
prohibited on the basis of a generalized suspicion of the capacity of arbitration to protect
statutory rights.179
Despite the strong pro-arbitration bias announced in the aforementioned cases, doubts
still remained as to whether the Supreme Court would compel arbitration of statutory claims
falling outside the commercial context of those cases. In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,180 the Supreme Court laid most of these doubts to rest. The plaintiff in Gilmer had
been required by his employer to register with the New York Stock Exchange and his
registration application included an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising out of the
termination of his employment. When plaintiff was terminated at age 62, he brought suit in
federal district court, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
The employer moved to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA and the Supreme Court
held that arbitration should be compelled, concluding that there had been no showing that
Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act.181
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“In Mitsubishi, … we recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal
complications of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision. Likewise, we
have concluded that the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on
substantive rights. Finally, … there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law;
although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.” McMahon, supra, 482 U.S. at 232.
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As a direct result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer, there has been an increased
interest in the use of mandatory arbitration of many different types of statute-based disputes.182
This increased use of arbitration is itself quite controversial and focuses on the potential
unfairness of imposing binding arbitration on unsuspecting consumers, employees, patients, etc.
due to the lack of negotiation between the parties. Given the rapidly expanding use of contract
arbitration giving neutral arbitrators decision making authority in civil disputes that is almost
equal to that of their judicial counterparts, coupled with the recognition that arbitrations are
private proceedings in which there is limited access to judicial review of the proceedings or the
arbitrator’s decision, the New Ethics Rules are both appropriate and necessary if arbitration is to
be perceived as a process that is inherently fair and a reasonable alternative to litigation. It has
been held that a dispute resolution process is not an arbitration unless it includes a mechanism
for ensuring neutrality in the rendering of the decision. 183 If arbitrator’s are going to have
decision making power greater than that afforded judges, whose proceedings are open to the
public and whose decisions are subject to several levels of judicial review, then it is submitted
that it is reasonable to expect arbitrators to abide by ethics rules that are at least as strict as those
followed by their judicial counterparts in order to ensure the neutrality of the decision maker.
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B.

Should the New Ethics Rules be Invalidated under the Federal
Securities Law?

This question calls into issue the friction between the national policy of consistent
handling of securities disputes and uniform application of the NASD / NYSE arbitration rules,
on the one hand, and the perceived need for greater procedural safeguards in private arbitration
given the expanded scope of arbitrability to include statute-based claims and other matters
arising outside the context of the parties’ commercial agreement, on the other. Based on the
discussion in Section 3(A), it would appear that this issue will be resolved in favor of exempting
the NASD and NYSE from the New Ethics Rules because those rules, standards and procedures
directly conflict with and exert an “extraneous pull” on the regulatory scheme established by
Congress for resolving securities industry disputes.
C.

Should the New Ethics Rules be Invalidated under the FAA?

As the discussion in Section 3 demonstrates, the case controversies which have arisen to
date have focused on the expanded disclosure requirements contained in the New Ethics Rules.
What the Azteca decision illustrates is that disqualification of an arbitrator is automatic once a
timely demand is made based upon an arbitrator’s improper disclosures and that vacatur under
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2(a)(6) is mandatory if the arbitrator making
the award was subject to disqualification upon a grounds specified in California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of a timely demand to disqualify himself or
herself. It is this aspect of the New Ethics Rules that is starkly at odds with the FAA.
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Under the FAA, an arbitrator’s mere failure to disclose a conflict is not a basis to vacate
an award. Proof of partiality is required.184 Since California courts have routinely treated the
failure to make disclosures as arbitrator misconduct under California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1286.2(a)(3), Section 1286.2(a)(6) would appear to be superfluous and unnecessary to
the protection of the integrity of the private arbitration process.185 Eliminating Section
1286.2(a)(6) would bring California’s grounds for vacatur in line with Section 10 of the FAA
and eliminate this controversial issue.
One authority has predicted that to the extent the California grounds for vacatur departs
from the grounds provided under the FAA, “there is a significant potential that litigation will
ensue over whether an award involves interstate commerce” and, if so, whether the California
grounds for vacatur are preempted by the FAA.186 Another authority has described such
anticipated challenges as the “second generation” of FAA preemption cases involving
preemption challenges to state laws that regulate the arbitration process, as distinguished from
the “first generation” of cases which involved state laws directed at invalidating the parties’
agreements to arbitrate.187 While the provisions for vacatur for improper disclosure under
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2 have been recognized as raising the “specter
of federal preemption,”188 the cases which have subjected that code section to preemption
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analysis have thus far determined that the FAA does not preempt California’s vacatur
requirements.189 Those cases, however, have not dealt specifically with Section 1286.2(a)(6).
Given the Azteca court’s application of Section 1286.2(a)(6) as discussed in Section 3(D), above,
it is anticipated that it is only a matter of time before this code section is directly challenged in
the courts.
Even if Section 1286.2(a)(6) is challenged on FAA preemption grounds, several
authorities have noted that there is an “important caveat to the general rule of FAA preemption”
as set forth in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Volt and Mastrobuono.190 The Supreme Court’s
focus in those two cases was on the effect of FAA preemption on the choice of law provisions
frequently included in commercial contracts. “Plain and simple, in Volt the Supreme Court held
that the intent of the parties to an arbitration agreement, as expressed in the contract between
them, to conduct their arbitration under state law rules effectively trumps the preemptive effect
of the FAA.”191 The governing state law selected by the parties per their agreement will control
even when the selected state law “results in an arbitration conducted in a manner inconsistent
with the substantive law of commercial arbitration set out in the FAA.”192
While FAA preemption is a much more difficult issue to predict with regard to such
“back end” issues as confirmation, modification and vacatur of awards, because those issues
concern the effectuation of the result of the arbitration “and thereby serve to effectively
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culminate enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate,”193 it is expected that FAA
preemption of Section 1286.2(a)(6) is likely at least with respect to contracts involving interstate
commerce where there is no choice-of-law provision subjecting the parties to arbitration in
accordance with California law.
5.

Conclusion

The stated goals of the New Ethics Rules are “to inform and protect participants in
arbitration, and to promote public confidence in the arbitration process.”194 This is a laudable
goal, especially since arbitration is a private process that is dependent on public acceptance. The
heart of the controversy concerning the New Ethics Rules seems to revolve around the practical
inconvenience and cost burden associated with compliance. It is submitted that such a burden
goes with the privilege of being empowered to decide parties’ fates by determining the outcome
of their disputes with binding finality and limited judicial review. Because arbitration is no
longer limited to the commercial disputes arising from the parties’ contracts and has been
expanded to include claims that theretofore only could have been heard and decided in the
courts, so too should the ethics rules governing neutral arbitrators also be expanded to include
disclosures akin to what is required of judges.
While everyone agrees that some level of arbitrator disclosure is in order, there is hearty
discord and debate on how much disclosure is necessary, whether can or should be legislated by
state statutes and whether the remedy for improper disclosures should be mandatory vacatur.
Arbitration reform by way of ethics is a phenomenon that has occurred first in California and
will most likely be unsettled for many years while the judiciary, other states and respected
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arbitration authorities weigh in on these issues. Until that time, private arbitration in California
will remain a hot bed of controversy and conflicting decisions which works against the stated
purpose of promoting public confidence in the arbitration process.
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